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Abstract
A control system verification framework is presented for unmanned aerial ve-
hicles using theorem proving. The framework’s aim is to set out a procedure
for proving that the mathematically designed control system of the aircraft
satisfies robustness requirements to ensure safe performance under varying
environmental conditions. Extensive mathematical derivations, which have
formerly been carried out manually, are checked for their correctness on a
computer. To illustrate the proceedures, a higher-order logic interactive
theorem-prover and an automated theorem-prover are utilized to formally
verify a nonlinear attitude control system of a generic multi-rotor UAV over
a stability domain within the dynamical state space of the drone. Further
benefits of the proceedures are that some of the resulting methods can be
implemented onboard the aircraft to detect when its controller breaches its
flight envelop limits due to severe weather conditions or actuator/sensor mal-
function. Such a detection procedure can be used to advise the remote pilot
or an onboard intelligent agent to decide on some alterations of the planned
flight path or to perform emergency landing.
Keywords: Formal verification, theorem proving, robust control, UAV
1. Introduction
Control law design for aircraft normally combines control engineering
knowledge with tests of stability and smoothness of control responses under
disturbances. This often takes the form of an iterative process of remod-
elling aerodynamics in wind tunnels and ultimately in flight tests. Given a
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particular open loop dynamical model, control engineering relies on math-
ematical theory that is implemented in computations of flight controllers
onboard. When the flight envelop is defined, it introduces numerical val-
ues which need to be carried through derivations and proofs of stability and
acceptable handling within the flight envelop. In this paper manual deriva-
tions are replaced by theorem proving methods. The procedures presented
go beyond algebraic computation and use higher-order logic, including han-
dling of functionals, operators, concepts of convergence, stability and levels
of smoothness measures.
The approach taken in this paper fits into one of the three stages of
formally verifiable controller design as outlined in [1], where robust control
theory verification is followed by verification of the software used for imple-
mentation. A third stage is to prove that the quantisation effects of the
obtained digital controller do not significantly effect the results in stage one
of the controller theory used. In implementations of aviation software, ver-
ification is often followed by redundancy-based safety analysis for critical
sensors and actuators using voting principles, the affect of which lies outside
the scope of this paper.
Realtime code-verification is systematically checking the correctness of
the encoded controller such as in [2, 3] and [4]. This paper focuses on ver-
ification of the control principles before it is implemented in realtime code.
An interactive theorem prover (ITP) is used for performance verification un-
der nominal environment conditions and onboard stability and performance
monitoring is based on an automated theorem prover (ATP) for excessive
conditions, including some sensor or actuator failures.
There have been prior initiatives on verification of safety-critical and
cyber-physical systems. Such are the European Integrated Tool Chain for
Model-based Design of Cyber-Physical Systems (INTO-CPS)[5], where a
Functional Mockup Interface (FMI) has been developed for integrating the
formal verification of Cyber-Physical Systems using the PVS [6] theorem
prover with model-based software to co-simulation these systems. This ap-
proach integrates simulated models in model-based tools such as Modelica[7] ,
Simulink/Matlab [8] or 20-sim [9] with the FMI interface to verify the control
system according to the required specifications using formal methods.
The FMI is also implemented in [10] using Isabelle/UTP [11], where Mod-
elica is used to model the control system of a train then the model is encoded
in Isabelle/UTP with FMI framework for co-simulation. Another project is
the ERATO Metamathematics for Systems Design (MMSD) [12], where a
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framework is developed to use formal methods to verify automotive-related
applications in industry such as cars. Other projects are conducted by the
verification team of NASA Langley Research Center [13] such as [14, 15] and
[16]. Though these approaches use formal methods to verify control systems,
the derivations of control laws are not covered by verification before imple-
menting them. In addition, there is an absence of onboard real-time stability
monitoring of these systems by formal methods.
There have been several studies conducted to formally verify control sys-
tems. In [17], a framework for reasoning about the transfer function and
steady state errors in feedback control systems using HOL Light [18] theo-
rem prover is proposed. Adnan, et al. [19] formalised the theory of Laplace
transforms using interactive theorem prover to analyse linear control systems.
In [20], formal verification of transformation matrices of a coordinate system
is proposed for aircraft control systems using the Coq [21] theorem prover.
An autonomous vehicle controller is formalised and proved in [22] using the
PVS [6] theorem prover to illustrate its correctness in terms of stability of the
Jacobian matrix and then co-simulated using the PVSio environment in PVS
prover. Denman et at. [23] presented a method of implementing a formal
Nichols plot analysis of a flight control system using the MetiTarski ATP [24]
for stability verification. Araiza-Illan et al. [25] proposed a framework for
automatic translating the system block diagrams modelled in Simulink into
the Why3 [26] prover for verification. Verifying hybrid control systems using
differential dynamic logic in KeYmaera [27] prover also proposed in [28, 29]
where abstraction of the closed-loop behaviour is constructed for a class of
controllers.
Our proposed framework is different from this approach as we are ver-
ifying the correctness of the derived control law of aviation systems at the
design stage before the simulation step using an ITP, followed by real-time
monitoring of stability by ATP.
The novelty of this paper is to demonstrate that formal methods in some
iterative theorem provers are suitable to verify and prove the correctness of
robust control theory for a prescribed flight envelope of a multirotor aerial
vehicle. Although prior work suggested this may be a possibility, this is a
first evidence of this kind. This involves formal stability analysis to guaran-
tee system’s robustness then ensure aircraft’s safety by conducting continu-
ous onboard stability monitoring using interactive and automated theorem
provers. The methods are implemented in Isabelle [30] and MetiTarski [24] ,
and the codes have been made available online.
3
The proposed verification framework is applied to a control scheme of a
generic quad-copter presented in [31], which consists of a nonlinear attitude
controller to deal with modelling uncertainty and external disturbances that
is designed using the well-known dynamic inversion technique [32, 33]. Lya-
punov’s method [34] has been used as part of the attitude controller design
and to analyse the system to ensure its stability. We have applied our verifica-
tion scheme to the attitude control system since all definitions, assumptions,
derivations and performance proofs of the system are formalised then proved
in the Isabelle higher-order logic (HOL) ITP. Lyapunov stability of the con-
trol system is formalised and proved in Isabelle/HOL. We have implemented
the stability analysis into the MetiTarski ATP for onboard stability testing
to check whether the aircraft is in its stable region or goes beyond it since in
the latter case the autopilot system can inform the pilot/station to perform
an urgent action.
The paper is structured as follow: section 2 describes theorem proving
tools where Isabelle and MetiTarski provers are introduced; section 3 presents
the proposed verification framework of unmanned aerial vehicles; section 4
demonstrates the applicability of the framework on a multirotor control sys-
tem and describe the onboard stability monitoring; and section 5 presents
the conclusions of this work.
2. Theorem Proving
Computer based theorem proving is a computational tool set in some
logical system that can be used to prove the soundness and correctness of
mathematical arguments. There are two main types of theorem proving:
Automated Theorem Proving (ATP), which proves mathematical statements
automatically without human interaction, and Interactive Theorem Proving
(ITP), which automates steps of formal proofs by aid of a developer guiding
the process of proof. The automated steps rely on mathematical logic and
automated reasoning techniques. ITP will be used and described further in
this paper for the verification framework proposed. ITPs are proof assistants,
which formally define and prove mathematical theorems. Therefore, their
user can implement a mathematical theory by defining assumptions and some
valid logical statements, to start with. Then the ITP procedure will try to
prove a sequence of statements, relying on available formal theories, and also
by using existing logical methods and techniques or some external resources,
such as ATP tools .
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The distinction between ITP and ATP systems is not only that ATP
systems fully automate proofs but that ATPs tend to have restricted ex-
pressivity where, unlike ITPs, they cannot prove higher order mathematical
theories. Instead, they can be used to prove non complex mathematical for-
mulas that contain inequalities over real numbers, quantified variables, and
special functions. On the other hand, ITP systems have the ability to sup-
port formalising and proving mathematical theories, which involve higher
order logic, with the aid of a human supervisor in an interactive way.
However, using ATPs can be utilised locally in an ITP to prove a step in
the proof, by adding their packages to the ITP. This can also be done on-
line by using System on TPTP [35], which is a web-based system including
the most powerful ATPs that can be used to proof mathematical statements
automatically. A good example of a useful ATP, from the control engineer-
ing side, is MetiTariski , which is a first-order logic (FOL) prover that was
designed to work over the field of real numbers.
One of the well known tools in testing of the designed models and formally
verifying and validating their correctness are model checkers [36]. These tools
are used to model a system as a finite state transition, like automata or timed
automata, and system properties are expressed in the form of proposition
temporal logic. Then, the checking problem is reduced to a graph search and
an exhaustive exploration of all possible states is accomplished using symbolic
algorithms. However, model checkers are not applicable with infinite state
space designs and they can not use to prove the derivation correctness of the
designed control system. In contrast, ITPs can be employed to verify infinite
state space systems and mathematical arguments.
2.1. Isabelle/HOL
Isabelle is an interactive theorem prover (proof assistant) based on au-
tomated reasoning techniques and logical calculus. It is written using the
ML functional programming language such that the rules are presented as
propositions not as functions and the proofs are structured by combining rules
based on the λ-calculus. It provides the ability to express the mathematical
formulae in a formal language and prove them using different logical tools.
Isabelle/HOL is one of Isabelle’s platforms, which is based on higher-order
logics with quantifiers and semantics. Isabelle/HOL has a proof language
called Isar which structures the proofs in a readable and understandable
mathematics-like syntax for both users and computers. The mathematical
formulas can be formalised and proven in the Isar language with the aid of
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Isabelle’s logical tools. Examples of such tools are the simplifier, which per-
forms operation and reasoning on equations, the classical reasoner that carry
out long chains of reasoning procedures to prove statements or theories, au-
tomatic proof of linear arithmetic statements, algebraic decision procedures
for decision making verification, advanced pattern matching, and sledgeham-
mer for automatically finding the proofs based on already proven theorems
in Isabelle’s library and also calling external FOL provers (ATPs).
However, Isabelle has been chosen in this work for its rich logical and au-
tomation techniques since it has a large library, which contains most of the
mathematical theories that are useful in control systems verification. Some
examples of these theories are real, integer and complex numbers; Euclidean,
vector, norm spaces; differentiation and integration; real and transcenden-
tal norms; higher-order functions on different of number types; logical tech-
niques; algebra; etc. Isabelle also support other logical systems such as Hoare
logics for systems verification [37] in addition to the ability to generate exe-
cutable codes of the proved statements.
There is a wide range of syntax and command types in the Isabelle/HOL,
therefore, the most common and useful one for our framework will be de-
scribed. Isabelle/HOL expressions and symbols are described in Table 1.
2.2. MetiTarski
MetiTarski is a FOL automated theorem prover, which is designed as a
combination of the resolution prover Metis [38] and a decision procedure
tool QEPCAD [39] to conduct proofs over the field of real numbers. It
can be utilised to prove universally quantified inequalities of transcendental
and other functions, for instance ln, log, exp, etc. MetiTarski reduces the
problems to be decidable by replacing the functions with upper and lower
bounds on the real numbers field. It can perform proofs with the aid of
three reasoners: QEPCAD, Z3 [40] and Mathematica. However, we have
chosen MetiTarski to check the stability of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
systems due to its features of proving quantified inequalities including the
above functions over large scale real numbers.
3. An Aircraft Verification Framework
The proposed verification framework is shown in Fig.1 which starts with
formalising the aircraft’s dynamical equations of motion, the coordinate sys-
tem in the rigid body frame, the controller design, and stability analysis in
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Table 1: Isabelle/HOL symbols and expressions
Expression Description
→ mapping from value to value or function to function.
−→ refers to ”imply” in HOL.
⇒ used to define a function with its corresponding variables
types (e.g., real ⇒ real) that is a function maps from
real to real variable.
=⇒ refers to ”imply” in Isar language in Isabelle. (e.g.,
x = 0 =⇒ y = x) that is x=0 is an assumption and
y=x is the statement to be proven.∧
refers to ”for universal all” which applies to all assump-
tions and/or proof statements.
∀ means ”for all” or ”for any” and it is for a specific
assumption or statement.
∃ means ”there exist” or ”there is”.
∃! means ”there is only one”.
∧ refers to the logical and .
∨ refers to the logical or .
x
′
the 1st time derivative of x (x
′′
the 2nd time derivative
of x).
|x| refers to absolute value of x.
x$i returns the ith element of the vector x.
• an operator for the dot product of two vectors.
∗v an operator for the multiplication of a matrix and a
vector.
∗s an operator for the multiplication of a scalar value and
a vector.
∗∗ an operator for the multiplication of two matrices.
(λ t. x t) this is equivalent to the function x(t) but under the con-
straint of an argument (t).
norm(x) the Euclidean norm of a vector or a matrix.
SUP (x) the supremum value of x.
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the HOL syntax of the Isabelle prover. In addition, the stability analysis
step is formalised in the FOL syntax of the MetiTarski ATP for possible
verification of stability onboard the craft.
The verification framework consists of two stages: the ITP represented by
Isabelle/HOL to prove the mathematical derivation of the designed control
system and its stability analysis, and the ATP represented by MetiTarski
prover for continuously checking the validity of aircraft’s stability onboard
during the flight. The next section will illustrate these two verification stages
in detail.
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Verified NOT Verified 
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Stage 
2nd   
Stage 
HOL Syntax   
FOL Syntax   
Figure 1: UAVs verification framework
4. Case Study: Multirotor Verification
4.1. Verification in Isabelle/HOL Prover
In this subsection, we will demonstrate the first stage of the verification
framework shown in Fig. 1 using an attitude controller of a generic quad-
copter UAV proposed in [31] with considering the assumptions and flight
conditions made. In this proposed controller, the quadcopter’s rotational
dynamics are controlled using a robust nonlinear controller that takes into
account the modelling uncertainty and external disturbances. To ensure cor-
rectness of the designed attitude control where simulation cannot guarantee
that the UAV’s control system is robust for all possible flight conditions,
the design’s derivations and stability analysis have been verified using Is-
abelle/HOL prover. Isabelle/HOL is chosen for this purpose due to its rich
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library of mathematical theorems which are required to perform the UAV’s
control system verification.
The verification process using Isabelle/HOL is illustrated in Fig. 2 which
mainly consist of two stages: formalising and proving procedures. The first
stage starts by formalising the quadcopter UAV system into Isabelle/HOL
syntax such as the coordinate system, rotational dynamics, time-domain
functions, proposed assumptions and aircraft’s stability analysis. The im-
plementation of the control design and aircraft’s dynamics includes a series
of definition, lemma, and theorem items. Some assistant lemmas were needed
to be formalised and proven, which did not exist in Isabelle due to that prover
library is still under development as is the case with other theorem provers.
The formalisation also needs to import some pre-proven mathematical theo-
ries and lemmas from the prover library, which are used in formalising and
proving the control system equations with the proposed assumptions and
definitions.
Much needed theories under HOL platform will be described here to il-
lustrate the formalisation and proof procedures. First of all, the main multi-
variable analysis package which includes Analysis.thy for functions opera-
tions over real field, Finite Cartesian Product.thy and Inner Product.thy for
definitions and operations of real vectors, L2 norm.thy and Norm Arth.thy
for real vector norms and their operations, etc. The HOL.thy is the core
of HOL platform which includes definitions of real numbers (real.thy), func-
tions (fun.thy), sets (set.thy), etc., which are necessary in all the formalising
procedures. The main multi-variable analysis theory, Analysis.thy, which
includes definitions of real vectors (Finite Cartesian Product
.thy), vector norms (L2 norm.thy, Norm Arth.thy) and their operations.
These theories are used to define the aircraft’s three-dimensional rotation
vectors and their norms such as the torque, angular velocity and acceler-
ation vectors where each component of a vector represented as a continu-
ous time-domain function f(t); the continuous function defined in Fun.thy,
Function Algebras.thy and Topological Spaces theories are utilised for this
purpose. The time sub-domain is defined by a time set T = {t. t ∈ {0..∞}}
and is followed by definitions of sets of vectors, which are working within T .
The matrices components are formalised usingMatrix.thy and their oper-
ations using Analysis.thy, Finite Cartesian Product.thy and Real V ector
Spaces.thy. The rate change of the quadcopter attitudes, i.e. velocities
and accelerations, are formalised by time derivation using Deriv.thy and
derivative.thy theories. The quadcopter controller design includes several ro-
9
bust assumptions which need inequalities over the real-numbers field. Fortu-
nately, such inequalities have been defined in Isabelle prover under Orderings
.thy theory. This is an important feature for any robust control design to
be proven. However, the second stage (proving procedures) is an interactive
process between the designer/engineer and the automated proving tools that
Isabelle prover has or supported. The role of designer/engineer is to help
the prover to step-by-step prove the statement in case that the prover is not
able to solve the proof automatically by simplifying the statement into sev-
eral steps. Each step should be proven suing the provided automated tools
before moving to the next one otherwise the prover will not pass the state-
ment. Example of the automated tools supported in Isabelle are: CVC4, Z3,
SPASS, E prover, Remote Vampire and SMT sovlers. In addition, Isabelle
has its own automatic proving tools such as auto, simp, blast, etc. Most of
the control system that we have verified required our interaction with the
prover due to the design complexity for the prover to solve them automati-
cally. The Isabelle code is long to be stated here, where only the important
definitions and proofs are shown, while the complete code can be found in
our online repository1.
The quadcopter attitude dynamics in Eq. 5 of [31] is,
J(η)η¨ + C(η, η˙)η˙ + d = τ, (1)
which formalised in Isabelle/HOL as can be seen the following code
definition ”att dyms τ J C η φ θ ψ d = (∀t ∈ T. (∀η′ η′′. η ∈ D3 vec set) ∧ Euler vec η φ θ ψ ∧
(∀i.((λt. η$i) has derivative(λt. η′$i))(at t within T )) ∧ J mat J φ θ ψ ∧
(∀i.((λt. η′$i) has derivative(λt. η′′$i))(at t within T )) ∧ C mat C φ θ ψ ∧
τ = J ∗v η′′ + C ∗v η′ + d)”
and the torque vector τ in Eq. 9 - [31],
τ =
τφτθ
τψ
 =
 `k(ω22 − ω24)`k(−ω21 + ω23)
b(−ω21 + ω22 − ω23 + ω24)
 , (2)
is defined by bounding all propeller angular velocities ωi with their maximum
value ωmax as
1https://github.com/Formal-Methods-of-Robotics/Quadcopter-veri
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Figure 2: Formalising and proving UAV’s controller in Isabelle/HOL theorem prover
definition ”torq fun τ = ((∃ ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4. | ω1 |< ωmax∧ | ω2 |< ωmax∧ | ω3 |< ωmax ∧
| ω4 |< ωmax ∧ τ ∈ D3 vec set ∧
τ$1 = ` ∗ k ∗ (ω22 − ω24) ∧ τ$2 = ` ∗ k ∗ (−ω21 + ω23) ∧ τ$3 = b ∗ (−ω21 + ω22 − ω23 + ω24)))”
The control input u in Eq. 18 - [31],
u = η¨d +Kre˙+Kηe, (3)
and the control law in Eq. 12 - [31],
τ = Jˆ(η)u+ Nˆ(η, η˙) + dˆ+ γ, (4)
are defined in the prover as the following code,
definition ”cont u (u :: (real, 3)vec) η′′d Kr Kη e e
′ = (u = η′′d +Kr ∗v e′ +Kη ∗v e)”
definition ”cont law (τ :: (real, 3)vec) u γ Jhat Nhat dhat = (τ = Jhat ∗v u+Nhat + dhat + γ)”
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The derivation in Eq. 19 - [31],
η¨ = Jˆ(η)J−1(η)u+ J−1(η)[∆N(η, η˙) + ∆d]
+ J−1(η)γ
= u+ (Jˆ(η)J−1(η)− I)u+ J−1(η)[∆N(η, η˙) + ∆d]
+ J−1(η)γ
= u− v + J−1(η)γ
where
v = [I − Jˆ(η)J−1(η)]u− J−1(η)[∆N(η, η˙) + ∆d].
(5)
is formalised and proved in Isabelle/HOL based on the att dyms, cont u and
cont law (see the proof in the repository). The closed-loop error dynamic in
Eqs. 22 and 23 of [31],
E˙ = AE +B[v − J−1(η)γ] (6)
where
A =
[
03×3 I3×3
−K3×3η −K3×3r
]
, B =
[
03×3
I3×3
]
, (7)
are implemented as
lemma Eq 22 :
assumes ”∀t. t ∈ T”and”(set of definitions φ θ ψ φd θd ψd η ηd η′ η′d η′′ η′′d u γ e e′ e′′ τ d dhat
E v δ C Chat N Nhat ∆N ∆d A B W Q P Kη Kr J Jhat”
shows ”E′ = A ∗v E +B ∗v (v − (matrix inv(J) ∗v γ))”
proof -
have ”e′′ = η′′d − η′′” using assms ddot error vec def set of definitions def by metis
thus ? thesis by (smt B mat def assms(2) exhaust 3 set of definitions def) qed
The set of definitions in the above code is a definition used to call all the
pre-defined definitions in one step. We formalised the assumptions proposed
in [31] as follow:
Assumption 1 (Eq. 14 [31]),
‖∆d‖ ≤ D, ‖d‖+D < D¯ (8)
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Assumption 2 (Eq. 15 [31]),
‖∆N(η, η˙)‖ ≤ S. (9)
Assumption 3 (Eqs. 24, 25 and 26 [31]),
sup(‖η¨d‖) < H (10)
‖I − Jˆ(η)J−1(η)‖ ≤ ξ ≤ 1, (11)
βmin ≤ ‖J−1(η)‖ ≤ βmax, (12)
in Isabelle/HOL as follow:
definition ”assump1 (d :: (real, 3)vec) dhat ∆d = (∆d = dhat−d ∧ norm(d) ≤ D ∧ norm(d)+D <
Dbar)”
definition ”assump2 (N :: (real, 3)vec) Nhat ∆N = (∆N = Nhat −N ∧ norm(∆N) ≤ S)”
definition ”assump3 a η′′d = ((SUP t ∈ T. norm(η′′d )) < H)”
definition ”assump3 b J Jhat φ θ ψ = (J mat J φ θ ψ ∧ Jhat mat Jhat φ θ ψ ∧ norm(mat 1−
Jhat ∗ ∗ matrix inv(J)) ≤ ξ ∧ βmin ≤ norm(matrix inv(J)) ∧ norm(matrix inv(J)) ≤ βmax)”
Stability analysis of the attitude controller as stated in Eqs. 27-37 of
[31] is implemented in Isabelle/HOL using a set of definitions, definition,
several lemmas, lemma, and short theorems in terms of theorem, theorem.
This structure of using several lemmas and theorems during the proof is due
to the fact that the reasoning system of the theorem prover cannot handle
long proofs with many assumptions, i.e. the system unable to prove many
equations if they are formalised in only one lemma or theorem style. However,
the stability analysis starts by defining the candidate Lyapunov function V as
in Eq. 27 of [31] which is formalised as a definition in Isabelle/HOL:
definition ”Lyapunov V E = (∀t ∈ T. if (E :: (real, 6)vec) 6= 0 then (∃a. V (E) = (a :: real) ∧
continuous on D6 vec set V ∧ V (E) > 0) else V (E) = 0)”
Taking the candidate Lyapunov function V , the time derivative of Lyapunov
function is derived and the derivations in Eqs. 28-30 in [31] are proven
symbolically and detailed in the online repository above.
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theorem Stb Eqs 28 30 :
assumes ”∀E. E 6= 0” and ”Lyapunov V E” and ”V (E) = E • (Q ∗v E)” and ”A mat A”
and ”E′ = A ∗v E +B ∗v (v − (matrix inv(J) ∗v γ))”
and ”(∀t ∈ T. ((λt. V (E)) has derivative (λt. V ′(E)))(at t within T ))”
shows ”V ′(E) = −(E • (P ∗v E)) + 2 ∗ (((E v∗ Q) v∗ B) • (v −matrix inv(J) ∗v γ))”
proof - . . . qed
The term γ in Eq. 31 of [31],
γ =

δ(E)
‖BTQE‖B
TQE ‖BTQE‖ ≥ σ
δ(E)
σ
BTQE ‖BTQE‖ < σ
(13)
is defined then the derivation in Eq. 32 - [31] is performed using Cauchy-
Schwartz inequality (see ”theorem Eq 32” in the repository). Based on Eq.
33 - [31],
δ(E) ≥ ‖v‖
βmin
(14)
and the upper bound of norm of v derived in Eq. 34 - [31] (see ”theorem
Eq 34” in the repository), δ(E) in Eq. 35 - [31] is obtained (see ”theorem
Eq 35” in the repository). The terms γ and δ(E) are implemented in the
prover as ”gamma def” and ”delta def” respectively,
definition ”gamma def γ B Q δ E = (∀t ∈ T. if (norm(transpose(B) ∗v (Q ∗v E)) ≥ σ) then
(γ = (δ/norm(transpose(B) ∗v (Q ∗v E))) ∗s (transpose(B) ∗v (Q ∗v E))) else
(γ = (δ/σ) ∗s (transpose(B) ∗v (Q ∗v E))))”
definition ”delta def δ (v :: (real, 3)vec) = (∀ t ∈ T. ∃ε. ε > 0 ∧ norm(v) ≤ ε→ δ ≥ ε/βmin)”
Note that the short arrow → in the code refers to implies while the longer
−→ refers to convergence in HOL.
Finally, based on all the above definitions and assumptions, it has been
verified that the proposed control system is asymptotically stable since the
time derivative of Lyapunov function in Eq. 36 and 37 - [31],
V˙ (E) = −ETPE + 2ETQB(v − J−1(η) δ(E)‖BTQE‖B
TQE) < 0 (15)
V˙ (E) = −ETPE + 2ETQB(v − J−1(η)δ(E)
σ
BTQE) < 0 (16)
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is strictly negative for ∀E 6= 0. It has also been proven that the tracking error
converges to zero as the time converges to infinity, (‖E‖ −→ 0). The code
below illustrates the symbolic proof in Isabelle theorem prover.
theorem Stb Eq 36 37 :
assumes ”(set of definitions φ θ ψ φd θd ψd η ηd η
′ η′d η
′′ η′′d u γ e e
′ e′′ τ d dhat E v δ
C Chat N Nhat ∆N ∆d A B W Q P Kη Kr J Jhat” and ”assump1 d dhat ∆d” and ”assump3a η
′′
d ”
and ”assump3b J Jhat φ θ ψ” and ”∀E. E 6= 0” and ”Lyapunov V E” and ”V (E) = E • (Q ∗v E)”
and ”(∀t ∈ T. ((λt. V (E)) has derivative (λt. V ′(E)))(at t within T ))” and ”η′′ = u − v +
matrix inv(J) ∗v γ” and ”E′ = A ∗v E+B ∗v (v− (matrix inv(J) ∗v γ))” and ”V ′(E) = −(E • (P ∗v
E)) + 2 ∗ (((Ev∗Q)v∗B) • (v −matrix inv(J) ∗v γ))”
shows ”norm(transpose(B) ∗v (Q ∗v E)) ≥ σ =⇒ V ′(E) < 0”
and ”norm(transpose(B) ∗v (Q ∗v E)) < σ =⇒ V ′(E) < 0” and ”((λt.norm(E)) −→ 0)
(at t within T )”
proof -
show ”norm(transpose(B)∗v (Q∗v E)) ≥ σ =⇒ V ′(E) < 0” using assms Eq 22 rel simps(93) by
metis
then show ”norm(transpose(B) ∗v (Q ∗v E)) < σ =⇒ V ′(E) < 0” using assms Eq 22
rel simps(93) by metis
show ”((λt.norm(E)) −→ 0)(at t within T )” using assms by auto
qed
4.2. Onboard Verification for a Safe Flight using MetiTarski prover
The control system of the UAV can be designed, simulated and verified
at the model/design stage. The designed controller then formalised to its
corresponding code and implemented into the autopilot system, which con-
trols the aircraft trajectory. The aircraft controlled by the autopilot can be
exposed to gusts of wind which may cause unstable flight. In this case, the
autopilot system cannot be informed if the aircraft has entered an unsta-
ble region which may cause a crash or lose of human(s) life. Therefore, we
proposed using of ATP tool represented by MetiTarski prover for onboard
verification that the prover can check the stability state of the aircraft and
inform the autopilot in case of any unstable behaviour detected.
The autopilot then can send warning messages to the user/pilot or base
station to perform, for instance, an emergency safe landing using autolanding
techniques such as in [41]. This will ensure more safe flight and may avoid
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losing the aircraft or any harm to humans and properties. We have chosen
MetiTarski ATP to verify the controller stability of the aircraft due to its
ability of deal with inequalities with numerical real numbers. Unlike the
previous verification stage using Isabelle, MetiTarski proves the statements
automatically without the need to any interaction with designer/engineer.
MetiTarski can be implemented on the autopilot’s electronic board such
as PixHawk [42] or Navio2 [43] Raspberry Pi. These electronic autopilots use
the Linux operating system where MetiTarski can also be installed. There-
fore, an interface between the two systems (autopilot and MetiTarski) is
easy to create in practice. The proposed onboard framework is illustrated in
Fig.3. The applicability of this approach is illustrated in simulation by inter-
facing the Simulink/Matlab model with MetiTarski and test system stability.
Note that the quadcopter that has been implemented in Simulink considers
the nonlinear dynamics of the craft based on the MathWorks model in [44],
which is widely used.
 
UAV 
 
Autopilot Electronic Board  
(Linux OS)  
 
MetiTarski 
Prover 
Pilot/Station 
 
Autopilot System   
Emergency Landing 
Scheme 
Interface 
Figure 3: Onboard verification framework of UAVs
Considering the stability analysis stated in Eqs. (15) and (16), the time
derivative of the Lyapunov function will be tested to check whether it is
negative definite or not. If it is not negative definite, then this indicates
that the control system is out of its stability region, hence the autopilot can
pass warning messages to the pilot or station to take an action or perform
an emergency landing. The verification process starts by formalising the
stability equations (15) and (16) into a FOL syntax. The parameters of
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these equations are passed from the autopilot system to MetiTarski prover
via an interface scheme. Afterwards, the test is conducted in the MetiTarski
prover such that V˙ (E) < 0. We have simulated the above procedures in
Simulink/Matlab to illustrate its applicability. The stability equations, Eqs.
(15) and (16), are simplified using symbolic computations in Matlab before
formalising them into FOL syntax. The parameters included in both stability
equations are passed from Simulink/Matlab to MetiTarski to perform the
monitoring test. The following code shows an example of stability check in
MetiTarski prover for Eq. (15) (note that the full code can be found in our
online repository):
fof(Stability Eq15, conjecture, ![E 1, E 2, E 3, E 4, E 5, E 6, Phi, Theta] :?[V 1, V 2, V 3,
Delta E] :
%assumptions
(E 1 = 1.6 & E 2 = 3.1 & E 3 = 2 & E 4 = 9.3 & E 5 = 6.8 & E 6 = 4.8
& Phi > −1.5708 & Phi < 1.5708 & Theta > −1.5708 & Theta < 1.5708
& abs(V 1) <= (0.5 ∗ (1.2 + (0.004 ∗ abs(E 4)) + (17.5 ∗ abs(E 1))) + (173 ∗ (0.001 + 0.001)))
& abs(V 2) <= (0.5 ∗ (1.2 + (0.004 ∗ abs(E 5)) + (17.5 ∗ abs(E 2))) + (173 ∗ (0.001 + 0.001)))
& abs(V 3) <= (0.5 ∗ (1.2 + (0.482675 ∗ abs(E 6)) + (1.8 ∗ abs(E 3))) + (173 ∗ (0.001 + 0.001)))
& Delta E > 0 & Delta E >= sqrt(V 12 + V 22 + V 32)/170.5
%implies
=> .... < 0)).
and for Eq. (16),
fof(Stability Eq16, conjecture, ![E 1, E 2, E 3, E 4, E 5, E 6, Phi, Theta] :?[V 1, V 2, V 3,
Delta E] :
%assumptions
(E 1 = 2.9 & E 2 = 1.2 & E 3 = 1.8 & E 4 = 6.9 & E 5 = 10.5 & E 6 = 5
& Phi > −1.5708 & Phi < 1.5708 & Theta > −1.5708 & Theta < 1.5708
& abs(V 1) <= (0.5 ∗ (1.2 + (0.004 ∗ abs(E 4)) + (17.5 ∗ abs(E 1))) + (173 ∗ (0.001 + 0.001)))
& abs(V 2) <= (0.5 ∗ (1.2 + (0.004 ∗ abs(E 5)) + (17.5 ∗ abs(E 2))) + (173 ∗ (0.001 + 0.001)))
& abs(V 3) <= (0.5 ∗ (1.2 + (0.482675 ∗ abs(E 6)) + (1.8 ∗ abs(E 3))) + (173 ∗ (0.001 + 0.001)))
& Delta E > 0 & Delta E >= sqrt(V 12 + V 22 + V 32)/170.5
%implies
=> .... < 0)).
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5. Conclusions
This paper has introduced a new verification framework for safety-critical
control systems by applying the power of higher-order-logic-based interactive
theorem provers and a first-order logic-based automated theorem prover to
verify the control system of unmanned aerial vehicles and to ensure air-
craft control system stability and performance. The framework relies on two
stages, the first is for verifying the design of the control system and its sta-
bility and the second is for onboard monitoring of the aircraft’s stability to
ensure flight safety. The framework has been demonstrated on a robust atti-
tude controller of a generic quadcopter UAV to verify the correctness of the
design and stability analysis in addition to onboard monitoring the conditions
of its dynamical stability while the aircraft is flying. The aircraft’s attitudes
are controlled by a nonlinear robust controller, which is designed using in-
verse dynamics control and it takes into account dynamical uncertainty and
external disturbances.
The methods used in the verification stages go significantly beyond sym-
bolic computation of inequalities for the Lyapunov theory as concepts of con-
vergence as mappings of functions and quantifications over sets of functions
are used in Isabelle and as such they were not be found in prior literature in
aviation control systems.
The paper illustrated the applicability and the power of interactive theo-
rem provers relying on HOL and automated theorem prover represented by
FOL for control theory. This is promising and may encourage the use of such
methods in control system verification of safety-critical systems in general.
The symbolic methods are generic and potentially generalise to verification
of a variety of industrial control systems, where performance loss is damaging
and therefore analysis is important to be carried out formally.
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